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Abstract
In this paper we verify the functioning of the standard neoclassical
adjustment to equilibrium after a demand shock in a non-cooperative
simultaneous Cournot duopoly with complete, symmetric and imper-
fect information. Our results show that in such a framework the ad-
justment to the long-run level of output by the entire industry or part
of it is no longer guaranteed. We show that the size of the demand
shock determines the nature and number of equilibria generated by
strategic interaction, whereas the post-adjustment real wage level de-
termines which equilibrium is actually obtained.
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1 Introduction
Much of modern macroeconomic theory is based on the neoclassical adjust-
ment mechanism to long-run equilibrium whenever a permanent demand
shock moves the economy away from it (Blanchard and Fisher 1989, Wood-
ford 2003, Benigno 2009). The adjustment process is essentially based on
output gap-induced movements in production costs (mostly nominal wages)
which - coeteris paribus - change ﬁrms’ proﬁt perspectives and therefore shift
the short-run aggregate supply curve along the new demand schedule, thereby
bringing back output to its natural level. Under nominal rigidities, if a nega-
tive (positive) demand shock occurs, the wage level decreases (increases) over
time because the economy is operating below (above) the NAWRU potential
level (Holden and Nymoen 2002, Baghli 2007). This, in turn, increases (de-
creases) proﬁts and therefore increases (decreases) the incentive to expand
supply. At the end of the adjustment process, the new equilibrium displays
an aggregate output level back to its long-run value, with a permanently
lower (higher) price level.
Being a cornerstone of neoclassical economics, the above-described adjust-
ment process has been used to develop many theories which lie at the core of
policy prescriptions in several areas. For example, Optimal Currency Area
theory (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963, Kenen 1969) states that countries
wishing to give up their national monetary policies to adopt a single cur-
rency must have enough labour market ﬂexibility so to ease the adjustment
mechanism after an asymmetric demand shock. Should such a ﬂexibility - es-
pecially on wages - be absent, retaining macroeconomic policy at the national
level is necessary for the purpose of optimal business cycle stabilization.
In this paper we pose a simple question: in a non-competitive market
structure, is there any equilibrium outcome preventing the economy from
returning to the pre-shock equilibrium output after a permanent demand
shock? Particularly, we use a standard Cournot setting with homogenous
good where, after the occurrence of a negative demand shock, two identi-
cal ﬁrms (as a consequence of an unmodelled bargaining process with labor
unions) face the following choice: either to increase production at a lower
nominal wage (thereby pushing the equilibrium back to its pre-shock level
but at a lower price) or sticking to the level of output (and price) in place
after the demand shock.
Our results show that - under very general assumption on technology - the
equilibrium outcome depends on the level that the real wage would achieve
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at the end of the adjustment process, if the latter actually were to occur. The
size of the demand shock shapes the set of pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria
that are actually achievable. Obviously the individual ﬁrm must have full
knoweldge of two factors: (i) the level of the real wage that it would face
if it were to adjust production ii) the proﬁt function of the rival. Formally,
we employ a non-cooperative simultaneous game with complete, symmetric
but imperfect information, which is the game-theoretical counterpart of the
assumption of rational expectations for the macroeconomic equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out
the theoretical setting and the general framework of our research question;
section 3 models the strategic interaction between the two ﬁrms and section
4 carries out the equilibrium analysis. While section 5 sums up our results,
section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Setup
The economy is composed by two identical ﬁrms (indexed by i = 1, 2) pro-
ducing a homogeneous good. Firms play a two-stage game in which the ﬁrst
is played in discrete strategies and requires ﬁrms to choose whether to adjust
or not to a demand shock, and the second is the market stage. As usual, the
model will be solved by backward induction, looking ﬁrst at ﬁrms’ behaviour
in the market subgames. To this aim, we have to describe the structure of
demand and technology. The good is homogeneous and produced according
to the following technology:
qi = L
α
i (1)
where Li indicates the amount of labor employed by ﬁrm i and α > 0 the
degree of returns to scale. demand and cost functions are respectively:
p = a0 −Q = a0 − q1 − q2 (2)
Ci = ωqi (3)
Accordingly, the only component of marginal cost is assumed to be the unit
real wage ω, which is the ratio between nominal wage w and the aggregate
price index P which is a standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Nominal wage
contracts are staggered so that w is ﬁxed in the short term and it is subject
to revision at the next round of the (unmodelled) bargaining process between
ﬁrms and labor union. Whenever the economic system - of which the sector
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we are looking at is a component - is hit by a shock, p and Pmove in the same
direction. For this reason, in the remainder we will conﬁne our attention to
variations in p without further reference to P. Firm i’s proﬁt function is
πi = (p− ω) qi.
For future reference, it is useful to stress here that, in this model, ω is
marginal cost and therefore, borrowing a label commonly used in the theory
of industrial organization, a0−ω is a measure of market size. Figure 1 depicts
the adjustment process that takes place in the economy after a negative
demand shock. We will use this Figure as main reference for the rest of the
paper.
Figure 1 The adjustment process at work in the Q, p space


p
Q
a0
a1
A
B
C



























































Initial equilibrium is in point A, that we assume to represent the long
run natural level of output (Woodford 2003). Then the economy is hit by an
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exogenous negative demand shock that shifts the equilibrium to point B. At
this point the standard neoclassical adjustment process would dictate that,
following the decrease in nominal wage caused by capacity underutilization
(or, equivalently, expectations of lower prices), ﬁrms increase production and
shift the supply curve to point C. Then, output would be back to the pre-
shock level and price level would be permanently lower. The contribution of
this paper is to verify whether the shift from point B to point C is actually
always consistent with strategic behaviour in a Cournot-duopoly setting.
In point A, Nash equilibrium is characterized as follows. Each ﬁrm hires
the amount of labor LA, produces the quantity qA, and earns proﬁts πA such
that:
LA = 3−
1
α (a0 − ωA)
1
α (4)
qA =

(a0 − ωA)
3
α
(5)
πA =
(a0 − ωA)
3

a0 − ωA − 2

(a0 − ωA)
3

(6)
Nominal wage is wA, prices pA and real wage ωA.We then assume a nega-
tive demand shock, which shifts the vertical intercept of the demand schedule
to a1 < a0, moving instantaneously the equilibrium to point B of Figure 1.
Nominal wage is ﬁxed because of staggered labor contracts, but price level
has decreased to pB < pA, so that real wage is ωB > ωA. Labor, quantity and
proﬁts in point B are:
LB = 3−
1
α (a1 − ωB)
1
α (7)
qB =

(a1 − ωB)
3
α
(8)
πB =
(a1 − ωB)
3

a1 − ωB − 2

(a1 − ωB)
3

(9)
Because of nominal rigidities, the economy is now operating below its natural
level. Standard neoclassical theory says that this generates a downward pres-
sure on nominal wage, coming from either a Walrasian or non-competitive
labour market. Under sticky wages, such a pressure will be accomodated at
the next round of wage contract negotiations; this will reduce marginal costs
for ﬁrms and therefore push them to increase production until the new equi-
librium is reached in point C. We instead assume that in point B ﬁrm i faces
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a strategic choice: it can choose between expanding the scale of production
at a lower nominal wage, or rather keeping the level of output unchanged at
point B with the wage ﬁxed. We can interpret such a choice as the outcome
of a bargaining process with trade unions: more jobs in exchange of lower
wages or higher wages (i.e., keep the wages at the same level as before the
occurrence of the shock) with fewer jobs. Such a structure can be reconciled
with the classical modelling of wage bargaining and employment (such as
McDonald and Solow 1981), where the bargaining process between a monop-
olist union maximizing some form of utility function and a ﬁrm expressing its
proﬁt-maximizing labor demand schedule endogenously gives rise to a trade
oﬀ between real wage and employment. If the entire industry adjusts wages
(and consequently outputs), the resulting symmetric equilibrium is repre-
sented by point C in Figure 1,where nominal wage will have gone down to
wC and prices down to pC (< pB < pA) . Individual proﬁts and quantities in
C are given by:
πC =
(a1 − ωC)
3

a1 − ωC − 2

(a1 − ωC)
3

(10)
qC =

(a1 − ωC)
3
α
(11)
3 Modelling strategic interaction
We now deﬁne smart the ﬁrmwhich, after the negative demand shock, decides
to adjust production, thereby internalizing the decrease in nominal wage,
and myopic the ﬁrm which does not. A ﬁrm’s proﬁts are therefore deﬁned
as follows:
πSj (ωC , ωB) = (a1 − qS − qj − ωC) qS (12)
πMj (ωB, ωC) = (a1 − qM − qi − ωB) qM (13)
where subscripts M and S stand for myopic and smart, respectively. Ac-
cordingly, depending on i, j = S,M , we have four alternative outcomes,
{(M,M) , (S, S) , (M,S) , (S,M)}, two of which are obviously equivalent up
to a permutation of ﬁrms. Outcome (M,M), in which both ﬁrms behave my-
opically, corresponds to point B in Figure 1, where proﬁts are πMM (ω0, ω0)
whose value is given by equation (9); outcome (S, S) , where both ﬁrms are
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smart and their output strategies incorporate the wage adjustment, corre-
sponds to point C of the same graph and it generates proﬁts πSS (ωC , ωC) ,
given by equation (10).
There remains to investigate the asymmetric perspective in which one ﬁrm
is smart and the other is myopic and does not perform the wage adjustment.1
In such a case, one ﬁrm sticks to the same quantity which is relevant in B,
supplying qMS = q
B = [(a1 − ωB) /3]
α , while the other sets qSM to maximise
πSM (ωC , ωB) =

a1 − qSM −

(a1 − ωB)
3
α
− ωC

qSM , (14)
which delivers:
πSM (ωC , ωB) =
1
9
4−
1
α (2
1
α − 1)(2a1 + ωB − 3ωC)
2 > 0
Conversely, the myopic ﬁrm does not adjust production and keeps paying
the initial nominal wage rate wB > wC . So its proﬁts read as follows:
πMS(ωB, ωC) =
1
9
(a1 − ωB)

2a1 − 2ωB − 2
−
1
α (2a1 + ωB − 3ωC)

> 0. (15)
Having fully characterised the spectrum of market subgames and their
outcomes, we may look up to the ﬁrst stage of the game, where each ﬁrm
has to decide whether to adjust or not to the demand shock, i.e., whether
to renegotiate the wage and therefore reformulate its production plan. The
upstrem stage is therefore played in the discrete strategy space (M,S) , and
is summarised by the following 2× 2 Matrix.
2
M S
1 M πMM (ωB, ωB) ; πMM (ωB;ωB) πMS (ωB;ωC) ; πSM (ωC ;ωB)
S πSM (ωC ;ωB) ; πMS (ωB;ωC) πSS (ωC ;ωC) ; πSS (ωC ;ωC)
Matrix 1
The equilibrium outcome(s) and Pareto-eﬃciency (whenever the latter
property is indeed relevant) are determined by the signs of the following
1It is worth stressing that this outcome does not correspond to any of the points
represented in Figure 1.
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expressions:
πMM (ωB, ωB)− πSM (ωC ;ωB) =
1
9

(a1 − ωB)
2+
4−
1
α (1− 2
1
α )(2a1 + ωB − 3ωC)
2

(16)
πMS (ωB;ωC)− πSS (ωC ;ωC) =
1
9

(a1 − ωB)2a1 − 2ωB+
−2−
1
α (2a1 + ωB − 3ωC) − (a1 − ωC)
2

(17)
πSS (ωC ;ωC)− πMM (ωB, ωB) =

1
3
a1 −
1
3
ωC
2
−

1
3
a1 −
1
3
ωB
2
(18)
Expression (16) indicates the incentive for ﬁrm i to increase production
qCi (decreasing nominal wage accordingly) when the rival does not adjust
and keeps producing qB with nominal wage wB. If it is negative, the ﬁrm
adjusts, otherwise it doesn’t and the economy stays in point B. Expression
(17) tells us whether for ﬁrm i it is convenient to adjust production when
also the rival does, and this happens only if the r.h.s. is negative. Finally,
expression (18) evaluates the Pareto eﬃciency in the symmetric cases (when
they both adjust or don’t adjust). If it is positive, in Figure 1 point C is
Pareto-superior to point B.
Given equations (8) and (11) we can rewrite (18) as:
πSS (ωC ;ωC)− πMM (ωB, ωB) =

qCi
 2
α −

qBi
 2
α
from which - since qCi > q
B
i by construction - we infer that: πSS (ωC ;ωC)−
πMM (ωB, ωB) > 0 and ωC < ωB=A. That is, the symmetric adjustment to
point C is always Pareto-superior to the symmetric non-adjustment in point
B. Also, we know that the real wage after the adjustment is lower than the
real wage before and after the negative demand shock.
The characterization of the equilibrium of the ﬁrst stage as well as the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game is given by the four pos-
sible combinations of the signs of expressions (16) and (17). We therefore
proceed to analysing the sign of both expressions with respect to ωC ∈ (0, ωB)
in order to deﬁne the equilibrium outcome as a function of the real wage level
that would occur at the end of the adjustment process.
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Looking at the payoﬀ matrix, we know that:
if
	
(16) < 0
(17) < 0


→ equilibrium is in point C (symmetric adjustment) (19)
if
	
(16) > 0
(17) > 0


→ equilibrium is in point B (no adjustment) (20)
if
	
(16) < 0
(17) > 0


→ chicken game (asymmetric adjustment) (21)
if
	
(16) > 0
(17) < 0


→ coordination game (two equilibria with symmetric choices)(22
4 Equilibrium analysis
As our aim is to analyze the determination of the four outcomes according
to the equilibrium real wage after the symmetric adjustment, we study the
signs of expressions (16) and (17) in a space where both curves are plotted
againts the level of ωC . We can immediately establish by visual inspection
that πMM (ωB, ωB)−πSM (ωC ;ωB) and πMS (ωB;ωC)−πSS (ωC ;ωC) are par-
abolic and concave in ωC. Studying the two parabola across the admissible
range (0, ωB), we can relate the realization of any of the above equilibria
to speciﬁc values of the post-shock real wage level ωC. As it will turn out,
there are four possible cases according to where the two parabola (16) and
(17) intercept the horizontal axis on which we measure ωC.
We set out formulating the following:
Lemma 1 The maxima of πMM (ωB, ωB)−πSM (ωC ;ωB) and πMS (ωB;ωC)−
πSS (ωC ;ωC) are both positive.
Proof. In order for the horizontal intercept to exists, the maximum of the
parabola (16)-(17) must be positive. Their partial derivatives with respect
to ωC read:
∂ [πMM (ωB, ωB)− πSM (ωC ;ωB)]
∂ωC
=
2
−2+α
α (2
1
α − 1)(2a1 + ωB − 3ωC)
3
∂ [πMS (ωB;ωC)− πSS (ωC ;ωC)]
∂ωC
=
(a1 − ωB)(3 · 2
−
1
α + 2a1 − 2ωC)
9
(23)
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The ﬁrst is nil at ωC = (2a1 + ωB) /3, while the second is nil at ωC =
3 · 2−
1
α + 2a1

/2. Plugging these values back into (16) and (17), these sim-
plify as follows:
a1 − ωB
9
> 0
9 · 4−
1
α + (a1 − ωB)

8 + 22−
1
α

(a1 − ωB)
36
> 0.
(24)
The expressions in (24) conﬁrm that the maxima are indeed positive
and also imply the existence of two horizontal intercepts for each parabola.
We can label them (ωC1;ωC2) for parabola (16) and (ωC3;ωC4) for parabola
(17). They can be identiﬁed by setting the two equations equal to zero and
solving for ωC . At this point, we can introduce a useful deﬁnition which will
facilitate the intuition later on. Since in the industrial organization literature
it is common to think of the diﬀerence between the reservation price and the
marginal cost as the market size, we deﬁne:
a1 − ωB = s > 0 (25)
which therefore indicates the size of the market after the occurrence of the
negative demand shock.
Lemma 2 Provided s < s, there exists a single value of ωC ∈ (0, ωB) at
which πMM (ωB, ωB)− πSM (ωC ;ωB) = 0.
Proof. For the parabola (16) - whose sign expresses the incentive for the
individual ﬁrm to unilaterally adjust to point C after the demand shock -
the two horizontal intercepts ωC are:
ωC1 = ωB +
1
3
2− 4 1α
4
1
α (−1 + 2
1
α )
 s (26)
ωC2 = ωB +
1
3
2 + 4 1α
4
1
α (−1 + 2
1
α )
 s (27)
As s > 0 because of non-negativity of proﬁts and 2
1
α−1 > 0 for any α > 0,
the intercept (27) is greater than ωB and therefore outside the admissible
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set ωC ∈ (0, ωB). We now need to verify that the intercept (26) lies in
the admissible interval, that is 0 < ωC1 < ωB. If it does, then expression
(16) changes sign within the relevant range of post-adjustment real wage
levels, which means that the individual ﬁrm’s decision to unilaterally proceed
to adjustment after the occurrence of the shock depends on how lower its
marginal cost would be. If it does not, then expression (16) is greater than
zero for any ωC ∈ (0, ωB) and therefore for the individual ﬁrm is never
convenient to unilaterally adjust, no matter how low the marginal cost would
become. Since the term 1
3

2− 4
1
α/

4
1
α (−1 + 2
1
α )

is negative for any α > 0,
then ωC1 < ωB.
Furthermore, ωC1 > 0 for all:
s <
3ωB

22/α (21/α − 1)
22/α − 2

22/α (21/α − 1)
≡ s. (28)
Thus, if indeed condition (28) is satisﬁed, then ωC1 ∈ (0, ωB), and the real
wage level after the adjustment process is relevant in determining whether the
ﬁrm unilaterally decides to exploit the trade-oﬀ after the occurrence of the
negative demand shock: for all ωC < ωC1 (i.e., if marginal cost is suﬃciently
low to ensure that the adjustment is proﬁtable) the ﬁrm adjusts no matter
what the rival does.
Turning now to the parabola (17), we can prove the following:
Lemma 3 Provided s < s, there exists a single value of ωC ∈ (0, ωB) at
which πMS (ωB;ωC)− πSS (ωC ;ωC) = 0.
Proof. Solving πMS (ωB;ωC)− πSS (ωC ;ωC) = 0, one obtains the two hori-
zontal intercepts
ωC3 = ωB + 2
−
1+α
α

3 + 2
α+1
α s

−

9 + 2
2α+1
α (1 + 2
α+1
α )s (29)
ωC4 = ωB + 2
−
1+α
α

3 + 2
α+1
α s

+

9 + 2
2α+1
α (1 + 2
α+1
α )s (30)
We can note by visual inspection that ωC4 > ωB and therefore outside the
admissible interval ωC ∈ (0, ωB). As for ωC3, it is always positive for any
α > 0. Moreover, we derive from (29) that ωC3 < ωB for all
s < 2(1− 2−
1
α ) ≡ s. (31)
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Thus, if condition (31) is satisﬁed, then ωC3 ∈ (0, ωB), and expression
(17) switches sign within the admissible interval of post-adjustment real wage
level. That is, the real wage level after the adjustment is relevant in deter-
mining whether the individual ﬁrm has the incentive to adjust production
when the rival has already done it. For all ωC > ωC3 (marginal cost would
anyway be too high to preserve proﬁtability) the ﬁrm does not have such an
incentive even if the rival has indeed adjusted.
Therefore, provided that ωC1, ωC3 ∈ (0, ωB) - which occurs for given
restrictions on the post-shock market size - it is clear that the position of
ωC3 with respect to ωC1 is crucial in determining the spectrum of equilibrium
outcomes (19)-(22) which are actually achievable in the game. In fact, for
any of the intervals in the range ωC3 ∈ (0, ωB) marked by the thresholds ωC1
and ωC3 we have each of the situations described by (19)-(22). Graphically:
Figure 2 Proﬁt diﬀerential against post-adjustment real wage level, i, j = 1, 3


∆π
ωCωCi ωCj ωB
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If i = 1, j = 3 we have the following order of equilibria:
for any 0 < ωC < ωCi : point C (Figure 1)
for any ωCi < ωC < ωCj : coordination equilibrium
for any ωCj < ωC < ωB : point B (Figure 1)
If instead i = 3, j = 1 then in the intermediate range of post-adjustment
real wage (ωC3 < ωC < ωC1) we have a chicken game (rathen than a coor-
dination game). The other two possible outcomes remain the same: if ωC
is suﬃciently low we observe a symmetric adjustment, whereas if it is suﬃ-
ciently high none of them does.
It is now convenient to order the two thresholds s and s. As next ﬁgure
shows, s− s > 0 for very reasonable values of ωB.
Figure 3 s− s
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The following proposition states the conditions under which any of the
two cases depicted in Figure 2 occurs, provided that s < s (so that ωC1, ωC3 ∈
(0, ωB))
Proposition 4 For all s < s < s the thresholds on the post-adjustment real
wage are ordered as follows: 0 < ωC3 < ωC1 < ωB and we observe:
I a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in (S, S) , for all ωC ∈ [0, ωC3) .
In this range, πSS (ωC ;ωC) > πMM (ωB, ωB) and therefore (S, S) ≻
(M,M) ;
II. a chicken game with two pure-strategy equilibria along the secondary di-
agonal, (M,S) and (S,M) , and a mixed-strategy equilibrium, for all
ωC ∈ (ωC3, ωC1)
III. a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in (M,M) , for all ωC ∈
(ωC1, ωB]. In this range, πMM (ωB, ωB) > πSS (ωC ;ωC) and therefore
(M,M) ≻ (S, S) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above proposition holds for the most realistic set of technology pa-
rameters, as it applies to the cases of decreasing, constant and (a very large
range of) increasing returns to scale (α < 3.106). The equilibrium outcome
depends on the real wage level ωC that would result after the completion of
the adjustment process, if it actually takes place. After the demand shock,
the real wage level is ωB > ωA. In order to facilitate the intuition, we can
think of the adjustment as a trade-oﬀ taking place within the bargaining
process between ﬁrms and trade-unions: as the nominal wage decrease, ﬁrms
increase production (and labor) which, in turn, decreases nominal price. The
combined eﬀect is certainly a real wage decrease (as we proved earlier that
ωC < ωB), but what matters for the actual realization of the adjustment is
the magnitude of this decrease. Indeed, all of this boils down to assessing the
ﬁnal level of the real wage: if ωC becomes small enough (case I), both ﬁrms
ﬁnd it convenient to adjust and the economy achieves point C in Figure 1;
if ωC does not decrease very much (case III), then both ﬁrms are better of
without adjustment, and the economy stays in point B; ﬁnally, for any inter-
mediate levels of post-adjustment real wage (case II), only one ﬁrm proceeds
to adjustment.
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Proposition 5 For all s < s < s the thresholds are ordered as follows:
0 < ωC1 < ωC3 < ωB, and we observe:
I. a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in (S, S) , for all ωC ∈ [0, ωC1) .
In this range, πSS (ωC ;ωC) > πMM (ωB, ωB) and therefore (S, S) ≻
(M,M) ;
II. a coordination game with two pure-strategy equilibria along the main di-
agonal, (M,M) and (S, S) , and a mixed-strategy equilibrium, for all
ωC ∈ (ωC1, ωC3). In this range, πSS (ωC ;ωC) > πMM (ωB, ωB) and
therefore (S, S) ≻ (M,M) ;
III. a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in (M,M) , for all ωC ∈
(ωC3, ωB] In this range, πMM (ωB, ωB) > πSS (ωC ;ωC) and therefore
(M,M) ≻ (S, S) .
Proof. See Appendix B.
In this case the post-shock market size s is bigger (as it is greater than the
threshold s), which is equivalent to saying that the shock has been milder.
For "extreme" values of the real wage ωC the equilibrium outcomes are the
same as in the previous contingency: if it decreases enough, both ﬁrms pro-
ceed to adjustment, if it does not decrease enough, none of them does. For
intermediate values, we have two pure-strategy equilibria along the main di-
agonal, corresponding to symmetric choices: either they both adjust, or they
both don’t. We are therefore facing a typical coordination problem. It is
worth stressing that the game retains a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium
for all real wage levels within the intermediate range.
Propositions 1 and 2 introduced a third threshold regarding the market
size after the demand shock (s). Next ﬁgure shows the size of s and s
according to the technological parameter α.
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Figure 4 the shape of s and s
Therefore s > s for any α > 0. As we proved earlier than s > s -
except for very low and unplausible levels of ωB - then we can state that
under general conditions s > s > s . Since we wanted to restrict attention
to what happens when horizontal intercepts ωC3 and ωC1 fall within the
admissible interval (and therefore the incentives for individual ﬁrms change
according to the end-of-adjustment real wage level) Propositions 1 and 2
analyzed, respectively, what happens when the post-shock market size s is
below s, which is exactly the condition for (ωC3, ωC1) ∈ (0, ωB). We showed
that in both cases for "low" and "high" levels of ωC the economy achieves,
respectively, point C and point B in Figure 1 (complete adjustment or no
adjustment). For intermediate values of ωC, depending on s being below or
above s (that is, according to the shock size), we have either two equilibria
on the secondary diagonal ("chicken game") or two equilibria on the main
diagonal ("coordination game").
What remains to be analysed is what happens when the size of the shock is
particularly small (i.e. when the post-shock market size remains particularly
large). Given the ordering in the vector of thresholds {s, s, s} , this amounts
to check the range of equilibria when i) s < s < s ii) s > s:
Proposition 6 For all s < s < s the thresholds are ordered as follows:
0 < ωC1 < ωB < ωC3, and we observe:
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I a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in (S, S) , for all ωC ∈ [0, ωC1) .
In this range, πSS (ωC ;ωC) > πMM (ωB, ωB) and therefore (S, S) ≻
(M,M) ;
II a coordination game with two pure-strategy equilibria along the main
diagonal, (M,M) and (S, S) , and a mixed-strategy equilibrium, for
all ωC ∈ (ωC1, ωB). In this range, πSS (ωC ;ωC) > πMM (ωB, ωB) and
therefore (S, S) ≻ (M,M) ;
Proof. Recalling (31), we then know that if s > s then ωC3 > ωB and
therefore (see Figure 3) the positive values of parabola (17) lie outside
the admissible interval (0, ωB);therefore, πMS (ωB;ωC) ; πSM (ωC ;ωB)−
πSS (ωC ;ωC) ;πSS (ωC ;ωC) < 0 for all ωC ∈ (0, ωB). At the same time,
as s < s then ωC1 > 0 because of (28), so that the parabola (16)
switches sign within the range ωC ∈ (0, ωB) and it does so at the point
ωC = ωC1 Therefore for any ωC < ωC1 we have both (16) and (17)
negative and therefore a unique equilibrium in (S, S). For the remaining
admissible values of ωC1 < ωC < ωB we have (16) positive and (17)
negative, and thefore a coordination game.
In this case, as the size of the shock becomes smaller (i.e.the post-shock
market size remains bigger), for lower ﬁnal values of ωC - as it was the case
in the last two Propositions - both ﬁrms adjust productions. For any other
ωC > ωC1 in the relevant range (0, ωB), we observe a coordination game.
Proposition 7 For all s > s, the thresholds are ordered as follows: ωC1 <
0 < ωB < ωC3, and we observe only a a coordination game with two pure-
strategy equilibria along the main diagonal, (M,M) and (S, S) , and a mixed-
strategy equilibrium, for all ωC ∈ (ωC1, ωC3). In this range, πSS (ωC ;ωC) >
πMM (ωB, ωB) and therefore (S, S) ≻ (M,M) ;
Proof. If s > s then by (28) ωC1 < 0, and therefore parabola (16) is
always positive over the admissible range ωC ∈ (0, ωB). Moreover, as s < s
by (Figure 4), then s > s. In that case, by (31) ωB < ωC3 and parabola (17)
is always negative. Therefore the only situation achievable is a coordination
game with two pure-strategy equilibria along the main diagonal.
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5 Summing up results
The central message of Propositions 1-4 is that the market size after the
demand shock (denoted by s = a1−ωB) determines the number of equilibria
obtainable in the game; then, for a given s, the level of the real wage after
the completion of the adjustment process if it were to occurr (denoted by
ωC) determines which equilibrium is actually obtained within the feasible
set. The following graphs summarise our results, taking into account each
relevant range of s, as represented in Figure 5.
Figure 5 The size of the potential market after the shock

0
s
s s s
Figure 6.a portrays the situation in which the size of the potential market
after the shock is very small, as a result of a particularly severe shock. Here,
there surely exist a large range of ωC in which at least one ﬁrm does not
adjust.
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Figure 6.a ωC1,3 in the interval 0 < s < s


∆π
ωCωC3 ωC1 ωB
C
chicken
B
In Figures 6.b-6.d, the values of ωC are such that only symmetrical equi-
libria may arise in pure strategies. However, since Matrix 1 can portray a
coordination game with two equilibria along the main diagonal, an asymmet-
ric equilibrium can still obtain in mixed strategies.
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Figure 6.b ωC1,3 in the interval s < s < s
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
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ωCωC1 ωC3 ωB
C
coord
B
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Figure 6.c ωC1,3 in the interval s < s < s


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ωC3 ωCωC1 ωB
C
coordination
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Figure 6.d ωC1,3 in the interval s > s


0
∆π
ωC3 ωCωC1 ωB
coordination
The intuition of why as ωC increases the economy tends not to adjust
has already been provided in the previous section: after the demand shock,
ﬁrms foresee the real wage level that they would face if they decided to
adjust production, and if it does not decrease enough they are better oﬀ not
increasing production. What remains to be explained is the fact that - as the
size of the shock decreases (i.e. s increases) - for intermediate levels of ωC the
equilibrium outcome is the coordination game rather than the asymmetric
adjustment (chicken game). Furthermore, the range of ωC giving rise to the
coordination game is increasing in s: for all s > s it is the only outcome
attainable in the game (see Proposition 4). In other words, as the size of the
shock decreases, the individual ﬁrm is increasingly less incentivized to adjust
production if the rival does not do the same: either they adjust together,
or none of them does. The intuition we provide is straightforward.In the
asymmetric adjustment where ﬁrm 1 increases production and ﬁrm 2 does
not, the price elasticity εP is
a1−q1−q2
q1+q2
. Partial derivative with respect to
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the non-adjusting ﬁrm’s quantity reads ∂εP/∂q2 = −a/ (q1 + q2)
2 < 0. So,
clearly, if ﬁrm 2 does not increase q2 , the price elasticity does not decrease
as ﬁrm 1 would actually want, and this eﬀect is bigger the greater the total
quantity Q(= q1+q2). Obviously Q is an increasing function of s, so for small
demand shock (when the total quantity is still relevant), ﬁrm 1 would rather
not adjust production unless ﬁrm 2 does the same.
6 Concluding remarks
The market-based adjustment to long-run equilibrium after a demand shock
is a cornerstone of neoclassical economics, and it is often used to design
policy prescriptions calling for a suﬃcient degree of labor market ﬂexibility
so as to speed the closing of the slack at the macroeconomic level. In this
paper we have tackled the issue from a strategic interaction perspective.
We have set up a non-cooperative Cournot duopoly featuring labor market
rigidities where, after a negative demand shock, ﬁrms are required to choose
whether to adjust production (with decreasing nominal wage) or rather to
keep output and nominal wage at the pre-shock level. When faced with
that strategic choice, the complete and simultaneous adjustment to long-run
equilibrium is no longer guaranteed. We have shown that the size of the
demand shock - as expressed by the potential market left after the shock hits
the economy - determines the number and nature of equilibria generated by
the game, whereas the post-adjustment real wage level (i.e. the level that
it would achieve if the adjustment process were in fact to occurr) selects
the equilibrium that is actually observed. Particularly, if the structural and
institutional features of the economy are such that the real wage does not
decrease "enough" at the end of the adjustment process, restoring the long-
run equilibrium might actually be impossible. Although it lacks a formal
modelling of the labor market - which we defer to future research - our model
oﬀers an alternative point of view on the mechanisms that are really at work
when an economic system is hit by a negative demand shock which creates
a slack.
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7 APPENDIX: Proofs
7.1 Appendix A
We have already established in the paper that s < s < s, so that we
can restrict our attention to the cases where the two horizontal intercept
ωC1, ωC3 ∈ (0, ωB). The ordering of the two determines the equilibrium out-
come which occurs for the intermediate levels of post-adjustment real wage
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(ωCi < ωC < ωCj with i, j ∈ (1, 3)) . Let’s compute ∆ω = ωC1 − ωC3 :
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as the term outside square brackets is positive for any α > 0, the sign of ∆ω
is the sign of the square brackets term, whose roots are:
s = 0
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Since s depends on α, so we plot:
Figure A1
25
which tells us that r2 > 0 for any α < 3.106.
Since
2(1+
1
α
)

1−

2
2
α

2
1
α − 1

− 2(1+
2
α
) < 0
for all α > 0, we can draw the implication that ∆ω has the following shape,
for all α < 3.106:
Figure A2
Consequently, we have proved that ∆ω(= ωC1 − ωC3) > 0 for any s < s.
7.2 Appendix B
Using the proof in Appendix A, we can simply note that for any s > s the
behaviour of ∆ω(= ωC1 − ωC3) is the following:
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Figure A3
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